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MCKEVITT V. PALLASCH: HOW THE GHOSTS
OF THE BRANZBURG DECISION ARE
HAUNTING JOURNALISTS IN THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
It is the endless pursuit of every journalist-the perfect story.
Two Chicago journalists thought they had found just that when
they heard the name of Michael "Mickey" McKevitt. McKevitt
was infamous in Ireland for reeking terror and havoc. However,
little did they know the journalists' protection was unavailable to
them when McKevitt successfully argued against it in the Seventh
Circuit. This note follows the tight line between a journalist's
fight to protect his or her sources and work-product and the court
orders that seek to peel away that protection. Through McKevitt v.
Pallasch, the Seventh Circuit revisited the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, the first and last time
the highest court considered the journalists' privilege.
Every day the media says good morning and good night to the
public. Whether it is the morning news or the daily paper, the
media provides information, debate, and news to the public. It is
the job of the media to be the eyes and ears of the people.' The day
comes full circle, as people fall asleep to the ten o'clock news.
The media, the press, the watchdogs; whatever you call it, the
media is a constant in our lives. This country was founded on the
belief that government cannot flourish without a functioning and
inquiring public.2  The ever-present press has become the
1. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 4, McKevitt v. Pallasch 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir.
2003) (No. 03-2754).
2. In his concurrence in Whitney v. California, Justice Brandeis wrote:
"Those who won our independence believed that.. .without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile... that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty. " Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
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embodiment of the public's debate To safeguard the vehicle for
public debate, the press requires protective measures to ensure its
newsgathering function is free from impediments.4
Historically, courts have challenged the media's search for
information. A general legal principle states that, "the
public.. .has a right to every man's evidence."5 This presents a
problem when the evidence is in the hands of the media. One
sector of the media, journalists, play a key role in forming the
foundation of trust along with the ability to coax otherwise
confidential information into the public's awareness. Acting as a
conduit, a journalist protects the public's awareness by relaying
information, which fuels the public debate. Essentially, the
journalist acts as a watchdog, a check on society's direction. In
order to protect the watchdog function of the press, courts have
developed the journalist's privilege.6 Throughout the years, courts
have routinely applied such a privilege to protect the press'
integral role in society.7
This note examines a recent Seventh Circuit decision, which has
alarmed news giants throughout the world and has many
journalists concerned for their ability to sustain their public debate
function. A three-judge panel ("the Panel") refused to recognize a
qualified journalist's privilege in McKevitt v. Pallasch. This note
considers McKevitt in light of the history of the journalist's
privilege in this country. Part II considers the intent of the
Founders and the importance of the Press Clause. It also examines
the special place the press and journalists occupy in society. It
considers why there is a need for a recognized privilege to protect
the newsgathering and dissemination functions of the press and
looks at early shield laws.
Part III examines the landmark decision of Branzburg v. Hayes
3. See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) (discussing the value of a
free press in checking the abuse of power by public officials).
4. See discussion infra Part II.B.
5. United States v. Bryan; 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting JOHN H.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)).
6. See discussion infra Part II.C.
7. Id.
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and the consequences and controversies it sparked. Part IV
considers the turmoil leading up to and culminating in the Seventh
Circuit's baffling conclusion in McKevitt. Part V examines the
Panel's decision in light of the precedent before it as well as the
consequences the McKevitt decision will have on journalists
reporting in the Seventh Circuit.
II. THE REPORTER'S PLACE IN SOCIETY
A. Why the Press is "Special"
The press and the role of the journalists8 have long stood apart
from society, occupying a special place within the functioning of a
democracy. In an address to the Yale Law School
Sesquicentennial Convocation on November 2, 1974, Justice
Potter Stewart heralded the view that the Press Clause of the
Constitution was a structural provision designed for the protection
of the media, and in turn journalists. 9 Justice Stewart believed that
the founding fathers intended to protect a whole institution of
press, reporters, and media from governmental intrusion. In fact,
Madison's version of the Press and Speech clauses which he
introduced to the House on June 8, 1789 read: "The people shall
not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to
publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of
the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.""
8. "Reporter" and "Journalist" will be used interchangeably throughout this
article.
9. MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 85-90 (6th ed.
2000); see also Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
Justice Stewart was one of the justices who joined in the dissent of Branzburg v.
Hayes, noting that the journalist's privilege to protect his confidential sources
was rooted in the societal interest of "a full and free flow of information to the
public." See discussion, infra note 86.
10. Id. at 85.
11. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (1789).
2004] 365
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Justice Stewart argued that the Press Clause stood for more than
merely a grant of freedom of expression. 2 The Framers granted
such a freedom in its guarantee of free speech. 3 Therefore, it
would be redundant to believe that the Press Clause stood for the
same proposition. In two separate and distinct freedoms, the
Founders intended the Free Speech Clause and the Press Clause to
complement each other, both with the ability to stand on its own
free grant of power. 4
The Founders set up a Federal Government with three distinct
and independent branches. Justice Stewart argued that this three-
branch system was intended to create an internally competitive
system. Justice Brandeis once wrote: "The [Founder's] purpose,
was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among
three departments, to save the people from autocracy." 5  He
advanced Brandeis' argument by articulating that the Press Clause
created a fourth branch outside the Government, but with the same
purpose of keeping a check on governmental powers. 6
For years, the press has been heralded as a watchdog of the
people. 7 Reporters have trumpeted the story of the underdog,
alerting the public to abuse by those holding political office. 8 The
12. See Franklin, supra note 9, at 85.
13. See Franklin, supra note 9, at 85.
14. See Franklin, supra note 9, at 85.
15. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
16. See Franklin, supra note 9, at 88.
17. See Franklin, supra note 9, at 88.
18. In his dissenting opinion in Branzburg, Justice Douglas expressed this
innate tension between the government and the press by saying:
The function of the press is to explore and investigate events,
inform the people what is going on, and to expose the harmful
as well as the good influences at work. There is no higher
function performed under our constitutional regime. Its
performance means that the press is often engaged in projects
that bring anxiety or even fear to the bureaucracies,
departments, or officials, of government. The whole weight of
government is therefore often brought to bear against a paper
or reporter.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 722 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
366
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press holds a place in society of protector and informer of the
people.'9
B. Why the Need for a Reporter's Privilege?
Reporters expend large amounts of time, energy, and resources
into their stories in pursuit of publishing the best possible
information. Because of the role that journalists play in the on-
going public debate, courts are eager to take advantage, targeting
journalistic resources with subpoenas." Reporters are subject to
subpoenas directing them to tum over their work product,
including notes, tapes, photos, and even information regarding
their sources.2 Journalists argue that court-ordered disclosure of
notes, documents, and other work product related information
intrudes on their editorial process, and thus violates their First
Amendment right to speak without fear of state interference.22
Tensions arise when reporters have promised confidentiality to
their sources in order to get the story. 3 Hundreds of news reports
19. See generally U.S. SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS CODE OF
ETHICS: "We believe in public enlightenment as the forerunner of justice and in
our constitutional role to seek the truth as part of the public's right to know the
truth." US Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics available at
http://www.hkbu.edu.hl/~jour/documents/ethics5.html (last visited September
21, 2003).
20. A five-year study released in 1999 by The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, found that 1,326 subpoenas were served on 440 news
organizations. Forty-six percent of all the news media said they had received at
least one subpoena in 1999. See The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, The Reporter's Privilege Compendium: An Introduction available at
http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/item.cgi?i-intro (last visited January 31, 2004).
21. See Karl H. Schmid, Journalist's Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An
Analysis of United States Court of Appeals Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1441, 1441-42 (2002) (recounting the story of freelance
writer Vanessa Legget, who was jailed after she refused to turn over notes, tape
recordings, and interviews she had produced in connection with her
investigation of a murder case).
22. See generally Reporter's Privilege Compendium, supra note 20.
23. Many people believe that the reporter's dependence on confidential
sources began when "Deep Throat" broke the story of the Watergate scandal.
2004] 367
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are published each day, where information is gathered and
subsequently to the public based on reliance by a confidential or
anonymous source.24 This can be attributed to the rising popularity
of investigative reporting, where sources are hesitant to connect
themselves to a potentially controversial debate." If journalists
cannot promise confidentiality to reluctant sources, these vital
sources will be silenced, thus "chilling" the free flow of
information.26 Not only does forced disclosure hamper journalists'
efforts to investigate news, responding to subpoenas also
consumes staff time and resources.27 However, lacking statutory
protection, the reporter's promise of confidentiality has little
weight in the courtroom.28
In order to protect their work product, and more frequently their
confidential sources, reporters claim a common law privilege. 9
The idea of a privilege is familiar in the legal world, extending
protection from judicial interference into relationships with
attorneys", physicians,31 husbands and wives,32 and the clergy.33
However, the use of confidentiality in journalism can be traced back to
President Franklin' Delano Roosevelt, who held press conferences on the
condition that reporters could not quote him directly in their stories. "So
accepted is the use of anonymous sources today among journalists that the rare
decision to ban their use from news stories usually is perceived by journalists to
be a function of political pressure, rather than an effort to improve the quality of
journalism." See Kathryn M. Kase, When a Promise is not a Promise: The
Legal Consequences for Journalists Who Break Promises of Confidentiality to
Sources, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 565, 568-69 (1990).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 591.
26. See generally Reporter's Privilege Compendium, supra note 20.
27. Id.
28. Franklin, supra note 9, at 623.
29. Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative
Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest
Need for Protection for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 97
(2002).
30. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). Hunt states that:
[t]he rule which places the seal of secrecy upon
communications between client and attorney is founded upon
the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of
the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in
368
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The essence of these privileges is to keep the sources
communications confidential, while the journalist's privilege is
rooted in the belief that the source's information should be made
available to the public.34 Because of this fundamental difference,
the journalist's privilege is not as widely accepted or recognized as
these other privileges. "
C. The Birth of the Reporter's Privilege
Until the late 1800's, there was no statutory law privilege
protecting a journalist's work product or sources from court-
ordered disclosure.36  Maryland was a pioneer, codifying a
journalist's privilege in 1896."7 Since then, many other states have
enacted statutes most commonly referred to as Shield Laws.38
its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily
availed of when free from the consequences or the
apprehension of disclosure.
Id.
31. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996). The need for confidence
and trust between physician and patient is crucial because treatments are often
contingent on "objective information supplied by the plaintiff." Id.
32. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980). "The modem
justification for this privilege against adverse spousal testimony is its perceived
role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship." Id.
33. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). "[S]uits cannot be
maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the
confessional." Id.
34. See Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield
Laws and Federal Criminal Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L.
REv. 445,451 (2003).
35. Recognizing the need to protect and assist journalists in their struggles
against court-ordered disclosure, a group of lawyers founded The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press available at http://www.rcfp.org (last
visited January 31, 2004).
36. See Campagnolo, supra note 34, at 447.
37. Franklin, supra note 9, at 623.
38. States with such laws are Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
7
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Although several states reacted to the need for a journalist's
privilege by enacting Shield Laws or through a court recognized
privilege, the Federal Government has no complementary rule.
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, during a period of
unprecedented civil unrest, the U.S Department of Justice began to
subpoena reporters with more frequency.39 Because there is no
federal statute recognizing a privilege against such mandated
disclosure, reporters sought protection under the First
Amendment's Press Clause.4" This came to a head in 1972.
Branzburg v. Hayes, was the first and last time the Supreme Court
considered the issue of a reporter's privilege against forced
disclosure of confidential sources.
III. BRANZBURG V. HA YES: WHERE IT ALL BEGAN
A. Background
Branzburg came before the Court during a time of revolution.
Reporters were busy covering stories about heated issues such as
race tensions in the south, the militant Black Panthers, and other
radical socio-political groups. 42 It was a time of rapid societal
change when many journalists risked their lives for information
that otherwise would remain out of the public's awareness.43 In
this flurry of debate and emotion, confidential sources provided
sensitive information regarding the highly charged topics, and
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and
Wisconsin. See Student Press Law Center available at
http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=31 (last visited September 12, 2003).
39. Franklin, supra note 9, at 623.
40. Id.
41. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
42. Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited. Confidential
Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 13, 16 (1988).
43. See generally Blasi, supra note 3.
370
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journalists were responsible for keeping their promise of
confidentiality to their sources. 4
Branzburg was the result of a consolidation of four cases that
dealt with the issue of whether the First Amendment protected
journalists from compelled testimony before grand juries. 45 Two
of the consolidated cases, Branzburg v. Pound6 and Branzburg v.
Meigs,47 involved a Kentucky reporter's refusal to answer
questions before a grand jury.48
Petitioner Paul Branzburg was a staff reporter for the Courier-
Journal, a daily newspaper in Louisville, Kentucky.49  On
November 15, 1969, the Courier-Journal published Branzburg's
story about two individuals who earned up to $5,000 a week
synthesizing hashish from marijuanai ° The article included a
photograph depicting a pair of hands working over a lab table with
hashish.5  The story included the subjects' wish to remain
anonymous; Branzburg, in fact, promised to keep their names
confidential. 2
Shortly after the article was published, Branzburg was
subpoenaed by a Jefferson County grand jury regarding his
knowledge of the conduct and individuals depicted in the story. 3
Branzburg dutifully appeared before the Grand Jury but refused to
divulge the individuals' identities, and disobeyed a court order
demanding disclosure. 4 A state trial court judge promptly ordered
Branzburg to answer the questions.5 Branzburg argued that his
44. Id.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), aff'd sub nom,
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1976).
47. Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971), aff'd sub nom,
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1976).
48. See Langley & Levine, supra note 42, at 17.
49. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 667-68.
53. Id. at 669.
54. See Langley & Levine, supra note 42, at 17.
55. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668.
2004]
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refusal to reveal his sources was protected by the Kentucky
reporter's privilege statute,56 the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, and sections 1,2, and 8 of the Kentucky
Constitution. 7 He argued that forced disclosure of the individuals'
identities would destroy the relationship of trust that he had
developed during his reporting duties. 8  The judge rejected
Branzburg's argument. 9 Branzburg then sought prohibition and
mandamus from the Kentucky Court of Appeals citing the same
authority as protection for the confidentiality of his sources.6 °
The third case, In re Pappas involved Paul Pappas, a television
reporter from New Bedford, Massachusetts. 61 Pappas was
assigned to cover a Black Panther rally in New Bedford.2 As a
condition for his entry to the rally, Pappas agreed not to disclose
any information or reveal any member's identity. Pappas observed
the Black Panther organization for about three hours; however, he
ultimately did not document the experience.63
Following Pappas' experience, a grand jury required disclosure
of certain aspects regarding his experience at the Black Panthers
56. The Kentucky statute, Ky.Rev.Stat. §421.100 (1962), provides:
No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal
proceeding or trial before any court, or before any grand or
petit jury, or before the presiding officer of any tribunal, or his
agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, or any
committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative
body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of
any information procured or obtained by him, and published in
a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcast station by
which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is
connected.
Ky.Rev.Stat. §421.100 (1962).
57. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668.
58. Id. at n. 5.
59. Id. at 691-92.
60. Id. at 671.
61. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), affid sub nom,
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
62. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672.
63. Id.
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headquarters.' 4 In keeping with his commitment to the Black
Panther organization, Pappas refused to answer the grand jury's
questions and filed a motion to quash the subpoena.65 The trial
court denied Pappas' motion and the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed the denial.66
Caldwell v. United States, the fourth consolidated case,
involved a New York Times reporter named Earl Caldwell. 67 Like
Pappas, Caldwell had been assigned to report on the Black Panther
Party as well as other black militant organizations.68 Caldwell was
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury in California.69 He filed
a motion to quash the subpoena on the grounds that such
disclosure would destroy the confidentiality and trust that he had
established with the Black Panther Party.7" He argued that
mandated disclosure of information and sources would seriously
hamper his reporting efforts.71 In response, the government put
forth evidence that it was investigating the group on allegations of
threats against the President, attempted conspiracy, assassination,
civil disorder, and incitement to riot.72
The district court denied Caldwell's motion to quash.73
However, it did issue two orders protecting Caldwell from having
to disclose any confidential associations with individuals within
the group, any sources of information received, developed, or
maintained by him in the course of his job as a journalist partaking
in the gathering and dissemination of news. Caldwell refused to
64. Id. at 672-73.
65. Id. at 673.
66. Id. at 674-75.
67. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom,
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
68. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 676.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 676-77.
73. In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 362 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd, Caldwell
v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom, Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
74. Id.
2004] 373
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appear before the grand jury and was held in contempt of court.75
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the First
Amendment affords a constitutional privilege for journalists who
are subpoenaed and asked to disclose confidential information.76
B. The Decision
In a 5-4 split decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the holdings
of the state courts and reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.77 Justice White, writing for the majority,
concluded that journalists do not enjoy a First Amendment
privilege to withhold the identity of confidential sources or
information from a grand jury."
The Court rejected Petitioners' argument that it is often
necessary for journalists to agree not to publish or reveal certain
sources of information, and court mandated disclosure of such
confidential material would act as a deterrent on the free flow of
information that is guaranteed by the First Amendment. 79  The
reporters argued that the grand jury should meet the sufficient
grounds standard before reporters should be forced to reveal
confidential information.8" Furthermore, only after all other means
are exhausted should the First Amendment invasion be allowed.8'
The Court held that reporters are not above the average citizens,
and thus do not enjoy exemption from participating in the judicial
system."2 Justice White rationalized his decision by stressing the
75. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 678.
76. See Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1084-85. Circuit Judge Merrill states that
"[t]he need for an untrammeled press takes on special urgency in times of
widespread protest and dissent. In such times the First Amendment protections
exist to maintain communication with dissenting groups and to provide the
public with a wide range of information about the nature of protest and
heterodoxy." Id.
77. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708.
78. Id. at 691.
79. Id. at 680.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Idat 690.
374
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important function of the grand jury in the judicial system.13
Although the Court declined to recognize a privilege, it was
explicit in pointing out that its decision was narrowly drawn to the
issue of compelled testimony before a grand jury. 84
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell suggested a case-by-
case analysis, balancing the freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony.85 Justice
Stewart authored the dissent, which was joined by Justices
Marshall and Brennan. Stewart advocated the need for such a
privilege based on the societal interest in the free flow and
dissemination of information.86
83. In Branzburg, the Court held:
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for
holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in
ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to
override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news
gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like
other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the
course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690-9 1.
84. See id. at 681-82, where the Court states:
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or
assembly to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that
news gathering does not quality [sic] for First Amendment
protection; without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press would be eviscerated. But these cases
involve no intrusions... [t]he sole issue before us is the
obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas
relevant to an investigation into the commission of a crime.
85. See id. at 710. Justice Powell argued that reporters should not be asked
to identify confidential sources without good cause. He stated that:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts
by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the
press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of
these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-
case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of
adjudicating such questions.
Id.
86. See Id. at 725-28. The dissent also recognized the importance of
2004] 375
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Although the Court refused to recognize a Constitutional
privilege in Branzburg, it did point out that the states were free to
enact statutory provisions providing such protection if the
legislature found the need to do so.87 Illinois enacted a reporter's
privilege statute on July 1, 1982.88
IV. MCKEVITT V. PALLASCH: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S TURN TO
DECIDE
A. Background
The trail of events that led to the Seventh Circuit case McKevitt
v. Pallasch begins in Ireland. Michael McKevitt was facing
prosecution in Ireland on charges of membership in an illegal
organization known as the Real IRA89, a splinter group of the
infamous IRA ("Irish Republic Army"). He was charged with
confidential sources in the newsgathering process, as well as the deterrent effect
a lack of privilege would have on the free flow of information. "The reporter's
constitutional right to a confidential relationship with his source stems from the
broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information to the public. It is
this basic concern that underlies the Constitution's protection of a free press."
Justice Douglas filed a separate concurring opinion in which he argued for an
absolute, constitutional right to reporters to refuse to take part in any judicial
proceeding. Id.
87. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706.
88. See 735 ILCS 5/8-901. Under the privilege, reporters are not required to
disclose the source of their information unless a court finds that "all other
sources of information have been exhausted" and that "disclosure of the
information sought is essential to the protection of the public interest involved."
735 ILCS 5/8-907 (2001).
89. The Real IRA (RIRA) was formed in 1998 for the purpose of removing
British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The group also seeks
to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process. Michael "Mickey" McKevitt
founded the group. The RIRA has around 200 members and carries on
bombings, assassinations, and robberies. See Naval Postgraduate school
website-from Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, United States Department of
State available at http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/rira.htm (last visited
September 28, 2003).
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directing and aiding the activities of the organization, with an
emphasis on his role in the Real IRA's attack on Omagh in
Northern Ireland in 1998.90 If convicted of the charges against
him, McKevitt faced a life sentence.9'
The key witness for the prosecution was an FBI mole by the name
of Daniel Rupert.92 In December 2002, Rupert entered into an
arrangement to supply interviews with three Chicago reporters:
Flynn McRoberts of the Chicago Tribune and Abdon Pallasch and
Robert C. Herguth, both of the Chicago Sun-Times.93 The
interviews were to be used in a biography that was originally a
joint endeavor by Pallasch and McRoberts, until McRoberts
dropped out of the project and Herguth took over.94 The reporters
were hired to work "as journalists rather than as ghost-writers" on
a book that was meant to be "an informative work."95
On June 20, 2003, McKevitt's attorney asked Northern District
of Illinois Judge Ronald A. Guzman to order the tapes turned over
on the grounds that the tapes would aid its efforts to discredit the
prosecution's star witness.96 In ordering the tapes turned over,
90. The bombing occurred on August 15, 1998 and was called "the
province's worst paramilitary atrocity." The car bomb attack killed 29 people
and injured more than 200 others. See Man Charged in N. Ireland Over 1998
Omagh Bombing available at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s940301.htm (last visited September 22,
2003).
91. Liam Ford, Reporter's tapes demanded for alleged militant's trial; 3 vow
appeal, cite P Amendment, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 2003, at N4.
92. Rupert was recruited by the FBI in 1994 and posed as a potential source
for Irish-American money and weapons. He reportedly met with McKevitt on
more than twenty separate occasions. The FBI paid Rupert to lease an Irish
border pub that was frequented by IRA figures in the hopes of obtaining inside
information. Rupert had been living in a witness protection program since
McKevitt's arrest in 2001. See Irish Court Convicts Reputed IRA Dissident of
Terrorism, CHI TRIB., Aug. 7, 2003, at C6.
93. Herguth's Emergency Mot. to Stay Order For Compel'd Produc. of
Journalists' Confidential Source Material Pending Appeal at 1-2, McKevitt v.
Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-2753).
94. Id.
95. Herguth's Emergency Mot., supra note 93 (quoting Pallasch's Decl).
96. McKevitt's order was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, titled Assistance to
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Judge Guzman stated that Rupert had no expectation that the
conversations would be kept confidential.97 He further stated that
"disclosure of the tapes does not involve the disclosure of the
identity of any source who wishes to remain anonymous."98
Pallasch's and Herguth's attorneys filed an appeal with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on grounds that the
reporters had a First Amendment privilege of keeping their source
material out of the hands of litigants.99
B. The Decision
The Panel, consisting of Judges Posner, Manion, and Rovner of
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, recognized that the
issue could not await a decision on appeal.' A denial of the stay
would make an appeal moot because McKevitt would have already
had access to the information on the tapes.' In an opinion
authored by Judge Posner, the Panel explained why it refused to
foreign and international tribunals and to litigants. 28 U.S.C. §1782 states in
part:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is
found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a
foreign or international tribunal, including criminal
investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order
may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request
made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the
application of any interested person and may direct that the
testimony or statement be given, or the document or other
thing be produced, before a person appointed by the
Court .... A person may not be compelled to give his
testimony or statement or to produce a document of other
thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.
28 U.S.C. §1782 (2004).
97. See Ford, supra note 91.
98. See Ford, supra note 91.
99. See Ford, supra note 91..
100. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 531.
101. Id.
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issue a stay of the District Court's order, ultimately ordering the
tapes to be turned over to McKevitt's attorneys.1 2
The Panel began its defense of the order by stating that section
1782(a) of the Judicial Code permits federal district courts to
mandate the production of evidentiary materials for use in foreign
legal proceedings, provided the materials are not privileged."3 In
deciding whether the reporters' notes and tapes were protected by
a privilege, and therefore not subject to section 1782(a) of the
Judicial Code, the Panel reviewed the history of the reporter's
privilege, turning first to the Court's decision in Branzburg °4
Posner pointed out that although the majority declined to
recognize a constitutional privilege for reporters rooted in the First
Amendment, many jurisdictions have followed Justice Powell's
concurrence. 0 5  Posner also acknowledged the fact that the
dissenting Justices in Branzburg argued for an absolute
privilege." 6
The Panel then considered how other Circuits have treated the
issue of a journalist's privilege in light of the Branzburg decision.
Posner referenced several cases subsequent to Branzburg that
recognized a journalist's privilege.0 7  The Ninth Circuit
recognized such a privilege in Shoen v. Shoen. °8 The Second
102. Id. at 535.
103. Id. at 530; see also note 96 and accompanying text.
104. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 531
105. See Powell's Concurrence, supra note 85; see accompanying text, infra
note 115.
106. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 531; see also Branzburg dissent, supra note 86.
107. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532.
108. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir.1993). In Shoen, appellant was
authoring a book on the long-standing family feud of the U-Haul founders, the
Shoens. Appellant had conducted interviews with various family members and
had many of them memorialized on tape. The family members who participated
in the interviews had no expectation that the information would remain
confidential. During the investigation into the murder of one of the family
members, Appellant was subpoenaed to turn over his notes, tapes, and
documents he had produced in relation to the book. The Court held that
Appellant was allowed to invoke the privilege even though he was writing a
book for profit and despite the fact that the material did not contain confidential
information. Furthermore, the Court applied a test to determine whether the
2004]
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Circuit recognized the presence of a qualified federal law of
privilege and even enunciated a test that many courts have applied
when faced with the same question. °9 The Seventh Circuit had not
yet been put in the position to decide where exactly it stood on the
issue of a reporter's privilege. t °
Ultimately, the Panel sided with the Branzburg Court and held that
the journalists involved had no conceivable interest in maintaining
the confidentiality of a source.' Posner based the weight of his
decision on the fact that this case involved proceedings pending in
another country."' He stated there was a need to balance the
international factor with the importance of a newsman's promise
of confidentiality to his sources. 13
The Panel noted that confidentiality was not at issue because the
source's identity was already known and Rupert himself did not
object to the disclosure of the tapes. 14 However, the panel pointed
out that many other cases have upheld a reporter's privilege
despite the fact the material did not concern a confidential
reporter's privilege existed. The test is whether the person seeking to invoke the
privilege had "the intent to use material-sought, gathered or received-to
disseminate information to the public and [whether] such intent existed at the
inception of the newsgathering process." Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1293 citing von
Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144 (2d Cir. 1987).
109. See id.
110. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532.
111. Id. at 530.
112. Id. at 532.
113. Id. Judge Posner stated:
The federal interest in cooperating in the criminal proceedings
of friendly foreign nations is obvious; and it is likewise
obvious that the newsgathering and reporting activities of the
press are inhibited when a reporter cannot assure a
confidential source of confidentiality. Yet that was Branzburg
and it is evident from the result in that case that the interest of
the press in maintaining the confidentiality of sources is not
absolute.
Id.
114. Id. at 533.
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source.' The Court referenced six cases that followed this view16
and only two that did not."7
Posner stated that courts which found such a privilege for non-
confidential material cited concern for harassment, burden on the
press, and using the press as an investigative arm of government."8
The Panel pointed out, however, that although Branzburg
recognized these threats, such threats would not serve as a basis
for recognizing a reporter's privilege." 9
The Panel stated that the First Amendment has little bearing on
compelled disclosure when the information is not coming from a
confidential source.' Furthermore, subpoenas directed at the
media should be judged by the same criteria of reasonableness
under the circumstances used when determining the
appropriateness of subpoenas directed at other parties.'
The Panel pointed out that Illinois had enacted a statutory
version of the reporter's privilege.'22  Section 1782(a) of the
Judicial Code permits federal district courts to mandate the
production of evidentiary materials for use in foreign legal
proceedings, provided the materials are not privileged.'23
However, in McKevitt, the Seventh Circuit decided that a state law
privilege is not legally applicable in federal question cases. 24
115. See cases cited, infra note 116; see also Neal, infra note 140, at 234; see
also Lopez, infra note 144.
116. In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998); Shoen, 5.F.3d 963; United
States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v.
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980); Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194
F.3d 29 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983).
117. United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir.1987).
118. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533.
119. Id. at 532.
120. Id. at 533.
121. See id. "We do not see why there need to be special criteria merely
because the possessor of the documents or other evidence sought is a journalist."
Id.
122. See 735 ILCS 5/8-901, supra note 88.
123. See 28 U.S.C. §1782, supra note 96.
124. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533 citing Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70 F.3d
503, 506 (7th Cir. 1995) and FED. R. EvID. 501.
2004]
19
Stamp: McKevitt v. Pallasch: How the Ghosts of the Branzburg Decision Ar
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ.ART. &ENT. LAW [Vol. XIV: 363
Moreover, the panel stated that even if the Illinois statutory
privilege applied, appellants' motion only cited to the statute.'25
Appellants' failure to discuss why the statute should govern
constituted a waiver of reliance on the statutory privilege.'26
A second claim brought by the journalists was that compelled
disclosure would result in the appropriation of their intellectual
property.'27 Pallasch and Herguth argued that if their tapes and
notes were turned over, the value of their work would be greatly
reduced.'28 The panel found that McKevitt posed no commercial
threat to Pallasch and Herguth because it was not his motive to
copy the work and sell it.'29 Citing a doctrine developed by the
Second Circuit, the panel opined that legal protection for the
gathering of facts and information is only available when
unauthorized copying is likely to deter the plaintiff from gathering
and disseminating those facts and information. 3 ° Based on this
test, the panel held that there was no indication that Pallasch's and
Herguth's book efforts would be frustrated if their records and
notes were made public.'
On August 22, 2003, following the judicial Panel's decision,
attorneys for Pallasch, McRoberts and Herguth timely filed a
petition for rehearing en banc. The petition urged the Court to
withdraw the Panel's opinion and issue an opinion recognizing the
125. Id. at 533.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 534.
128. Id.
129. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 534
130. Id. citing Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d
Cir. 1997). In that case, the Court developed the following misappropriation
doctrine: (i) the plaintiff generates or collects information at some cost or
expense; (ii) the value of the information is highly time-sensitive; (iii) the
defendant's use of the information constitutes free-riding on the plaintiffs
costly efforts to generate or collect it; (iv) the defendant's use of the information
is in direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiff; (v) the
ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce
the incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality could
be substantially threatened. See Motorola, 105 F.3d 841.
131. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 535.
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qualified journalist's privilege. 32 On September 2, 2003, a brief of
amici curiae in support of appellants' petition for rehearing was
filed by twenty-seven of the nation's leading news gathering
organizations, urging the Court to recognize the importance of a
reporter's privilege in the context of the newsgathering process.'33
Despite the wide-spread concern in the news world, on October
16, 2003, Appellants' petition for rehearing was denied. 34
Meanwhile, back in Ireland, McKevitt saw his fate sealed in
July of 2003. After calling the proceedings a "political show trial"
and firing his legal team, Michael McKevitt was found guilty and
convicted by the Republic of Ireland's Special Criminal Court on
charges of directing terrorism. "'
V. DISCUSSION
A. The Panel's Decision Breaks With the Precedent Of Many
Courts Before It
Whether a journalist enjoyed a qualified protection against
court-mandated disclosure of work product concerning a non-
132. Appellants' Pet. For Reh'g en banc, McKevitt (No. 03-2753) denied
(Oct. 16, 2003).
133. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1: ABC, Inc., Advance
Publications, Inc., The American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), The
Associated Press (AP), The Association of American Publishers, Inc. (AAP),
Bloomberg, L.P., CBS Broadcasting, Inc., Gannet Company, Inc., The Hearst
Corporation, The McClatchy Company, The McGraw-Hill Companies, National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), National Broadcasting Company, Inc.
(NBC), National Public Radio, Inc. (NPR), The New York Times Company,
Newsweek, Inc., NYP Holding, Inc., Radio-Television News Directors
Association (RTNDA), Reed Elsevier Inc., Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press, Seattle Times Company, Silha Center for the Study of Media
Ethics and the Law, The Society of Professional Journalists, Time Inc., Tribune
Company, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., The Washington Post Company.
134. See Appellants' Pet., supra note 132.
135. Omagh Families' Relief at McKevitt Verdict, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northern_ireland/3129037.stm (last visited September
20, 2003).
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confidential source, was a matter of first impression for the
Seventh Circuit. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits all recognize a qualified
reporter's privilege. 136 The importance and need for a qualified
reporter's privilege was even recognized in the international arena
in December of 2002, when a panel of five international judges on
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
established a qualified privilege that allows war correspondents to
refuse court-ordered disclosure of information obtained in the
course of their newsgathering activities in war zones. 137
Despite this overwhelming consensus that journalists and
reporters need a qualified privilege in their newsgathering and
dissemination abilities, the Panel, speaking for the entire court,
disagreed.'38 Following Branzburg, other circuits recognized the
privilege. However, although the Seventh Circuit ignored the
trend outside its jurisdiction, more surprising is the fact that until
the McKevitt decision, many courts within the Seventh Circuit had
recognized a qualified reporter's privilege.'39 Presumably, the
136. See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (1st
Cir. 1988); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2nd Cir. 1987); In re
Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 853
(4th Cir. 1992); Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir.
1980); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 989, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1972); Shoen v.
Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1993); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563
F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487,
1504 (11th Cir. 2986); Hutira v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F.Supp.2d 115
(D.C. Cir. 2002). Hutira involved an Iranian plaintiff seeking an American
reporter's work product to be used in Plaintiffs trial against the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Id. The Court quashed the subpoena, stating that Plaintiff had
not made a sufficient effort to obtain the information from an alternative source.
Id.
137. See Eric Lieberman & Fiona Campbell, International Tribunal
Recognizes Qualified Privilege for War Correspondents, 20 WTR COMM. LAW
10(2003).
138. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
139. See United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256, 1262 (7th Cir. 1995), cert
denied, 517 U.S. 1250 (1996) (affirming the District Court's order to quash a
subpoena issued to a reporter based on the fact that defendant had not
"overcome Wilson's [reporter's] First Amendment or Illinois statutory
384
22
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss2/7
McKEVITT v. PALLASCH
district courts will come down differently the next time they are
faced with this issue. Still, an examination of prior courts assists
in understanding where the Seventh Circuit deviated from the
logical conclusion.
In Neal v. City of Harvey, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois in 1997 was faced with the
question of whether to quash a subpoena issued to an investigative
reporter in connection with the shooting of a police officer. 4 ' The
district court recognized a qualified reporter's privilege, and
immediately turned its analysis to whether or not the privilege
applied in the case at bar. 4' Furthermore, like McKevitt, Neal
involved a situation with a non-confidential source.'42 However,
unlike the McKevitt Panel, the Neal court was not discouraged by
the fact that the source was not confidential. "The defendants'
argument that since Ms. Gomez [the reporter] is not seeking to
protect a confidential source, the privilege should not apply has
been repeatedly rejected."'43
Again in United States v. Lopez, the Northern District of Illinois
recognized the privilege by granting a motion to quash a subpoena
served upon an NBC reporter, seeking video-taped outtakes from
an interview with one of the defendants.'" The court once again
acknowledged the existence of the reporter's privilege, despite the
fact that the Seventh Circuit had not yet addressed the issue:
Although the Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed
the question of a reporter's qualified privilege, this
court has previously recognized the privilege, and
has stated that, at least in civil cases, it extends to
all underlying, unpublished material gathered in
preparation for a news story or broadcast regardless
reporter's privilege, to keep her sources confidential").
140. Neal v. City of Harvey, 173 F.R.D. 231, 231 (N.D.Ill.1997).
141. Neal, 173 F.R.D. at 233. The Court applied the two-prong test from
Shoen and held that the mayor had failed to sufficiently establish why the
qualified privilege should be overcome.
142. Id. at 234.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. United States v. Lopez, 1987 WL 26051 at *1 (N.D.I11. 1987).
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of whether the source of the material is
confidential.'45
Both in Neal and Lopez, as well as other cases that have come
before district courts, emphasis for analysis purposes is placed on
the reporter's function in gathering and disseminating information
and the public's interest in a press independent of governmental
control. 4 6  Despite these recurring themes, the McKevitt Panel
inexplicably chose not to follow the policy-based precedent.
Not only do these cases stress the importance of a qualified
privilege, more importantly they stress that confidentiality is not a
requirement for such protection.'47 The Panel acknowledged the
fact that many cases support such a position'48 but, concluded that
"[w]hen the information in the reporter's possession does not come
from a confidential source, it is difficult to see what possible
bearing the First Amendment could have on the question of
compelled disclosure."' 49  The McKevitt Panel did little to
reconcile its position with the trend amongst the Seventh Circuit
district courts' holdings that a lack of confidentiality does not
weaken a reporter's ability to invoke a qualified privilege. The
only comment Posner provided was that courts who took that
position were possibly "skating on thin ice. '
145. Id. citing Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas Levy Cir. Co., 455 F.
Supp 1197 (N.D.Il1. 1978).
146. See Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1292; see also Lopez, 1987 WL 26051 at *2 citing
United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (3d Cir.1983); see also von Bulow, 811
F.2d at 142.
147. See Neal, supra note 140, at 234; see Lopez, supra note 144.
148. See Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 33-36 (the qualified privilege for journalists
applies to nonconfidential, as well as to confidential information). See
LaRouche, 841 F.2d at 1182 (discerning a lurking and subtle threat to journalists
and their employers if disclosure of outtakes, notes, and other unused
information, even if nonconfidential, becomes routine and casually, if not
cavalierly, compelled). See also United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139,
147 (3d Cir.1980) (compelled disclosure of nonconfidential material "may
substantially undercut the public policy favoring the free flow of information
that is the foundation for the privilege").
149. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533.
150. Id.
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B. McKevitt Distinguished From Branzburg
Although Branzburg has never expressly been overruled, the
decision represents the opinions and ideals of a Supreme Court
some thirty years ago.'5' As evident in the views of the ten circuits
that now recognize a journalist's privilege, this issue and the
opinions surrounding it have greatly evolved.'52 In recognizing the
contemporary need to protect the creative and news-gathering
processes of the press, with the exception of the Seventh Circuit,
courts have disregarded the majority opinion and now authorize a
qualified press privilege.'53
The idea of a qualified press privilege is in line with what the
founders intended and with the historical role of the press in this
country.'54 By recognizing a qualified privilege, courts are able to
maintain a balance between the functioning of the judicial system
and the functioning of a free press.'55 Indeed, the Branzburg court
expressed its concern that a privilege for reporters would interfere
with the functioning of the grand jury and the judicial system.'56
Their concern is well-noted, and allowing a privilege only in
extreme and necessary situations also preserves it. Such was
Justice Powell's view in his concurring opinion, where he pressed
for a case-by-case analysis.'57
However, it seems noteworthy, and a bit strange, that Posner
quoted Justice Powell in his opinion as well as giving his views
151. See discussion supra Part II.A.
152. See cases cited, supra note 136.
153. The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to recognize a
qualified press privilege. In Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), the
district court held a reporter in contempt for refusing to identify the source of
certain statements used in his article. Id. The Appellate Court applied a
balancing test and ultimately concluded that the reporter's asserted First
Amendment Press Clause privilege must yield to the more compelling need for
the disclosure of the information. Id. at 468-69.
154. See discussion supra Part I.A.
155. See Shoen discussion, supra note 108; see also cases that recognize
qualified privilege, supra note 136.
156. See White's comment, supra note 83.
157. See Powell's concurrence, supra note 85.
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significant air-time, even stating that "maybe his [Powell's]
opinions should be taken to state the view of the majority of the
Justices.. ."158 Posner then went on to cite the many cases out of
the various circuits that "conclude, rather surprisingly in light of
Branzburg, that there is a reporter's privilege, though they do not
agree on its scope." '159 Despite the many references to the fact that
courts' interpretation of Branzburg, the Panel chose not to follow
the trend, a decision which will impact reporters and the news-
gathering industry.1 61
The McKevitt Panel issued a decision that was far-reaching and
radical in its interpretation of Branzburg.'61 Rather than
distinguishing between an absolute and a qualified privilege, the
Panel instead refused to draw any distinction between the press
and the general public at all: "We do not see why there need[s] to
be special criteria merely because the possessor of the documents
or other evidence sought is a journalist. 1 62 Posner's statement
seems to fly in the face of hundreds of years of judicial
declarations which state that, "without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press would be eviscerated.' '1 63
Instead, the Panel could have followed the trend of the other
Circuits, as well as the Seventh Circuirt lower courts, and
recognized a qualified journalist's privilege.'"
A qualified privilege recognizes the need for press protection,
while allowing courts to apply it on a case-by-case
determination.'65 A more consistent approach for the McKevitt
Panel would have been to recognize the privilege, however
158. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 531-32. See also Powell's concurrence, supra
note 85.
159. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532.
160. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1 (expressing concern over the
Panel's decision).
161. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 1.
162. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533.
163. See Justice White's comment, supra note 83.
164. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
165. See discussion supra Part IV.A. See also Powell's concurrence, supra
note 85 (advocating a case-by-case analysis).
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holding that the privilege did not apply in this particular
situation.'66
Although the Panel went on to claim that its approach had
support in Branzburg, this conclusion is difficult to draw. The fact
that the Branzburg Court was so splintered lends credence to the
fact that many Justices saw the need to recognize a reporter's
privilege, but were hesitant to recognize one in that particular
instance.'67 In fact, the Branzburg court explicitly stated that its
decision was based on the fact that grand jury proceedings were
involved. 6
Branzburg dealt with the issue of grand jury questions of
journalists; it did not consider the issue of compelling a journalist
to turn over work product created in the process of her
newsgathering duties. In light of the circumstances, the McKevitt
Panel's decision does not square with Branzburg. McRoberts,
Pallasch, and Herguth were not called before a grand jury to
answer questions pertaining to McKevitt's trial. They were asked
to hand over all material, notes, and tapes, produced in conjunction
with their newsgathering activities.
C. The Panel Should Have Applied the Balancing Test Adopted by
Other Courts
A majority of the decisions since Branzburg involving a
reporter's privilege have concerned the compelled disclosure of
tapes, notes, and records rather than grand jury inquiries.'69
Because Branzburg dealt solely with compelling reporters to
testify before grand juries, it left room for the discretion of future
courts whether or not to protect various types of reporters' work.
Courts have since structured a test to discern whether a privilege
166. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 3.
167. See Branzburg concurring and dissenting opinions discussion, supra
notes 85-86.
168. See Branzburg majority opinion, supra note 83.
169. See cases cited, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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protects the compelled disclosure of a reporter's work product. 170
This test is incorporated into Illinois' reporter's privilege statute.17 '
Under the Illinois reporter's privilege statute, courts consider:
(1) whether the person seeking to invoke the privilege had the
intent to disseminate the subject material to the public in his
newsgathering abilities; (2) whether the reporter is gathering news
for dissemination; and (3) whether the individual seeking the
compelled disclosure has exhausted all other alternative sources
for the subject information."'
Had the Panel applied these factors, a qualified privilege would
have existed. First, McRoberts, Herguth, and Pallasch undertook
the project of writing the book with the intent to disseminate
information to the public. The Panel was quick to point out that
the reporters did not want the information disclosed because "the
biography will be less marketable the more information in it that
has already been made public."' 73  However, other courts have
specifically held that just because the reporter is writing a book,
does not mean the privilege cannot apply.'74
Second, the reporters in the instant case were clearly gathering
news for dissemination. The book was intended to be a biography
of Rupert and his involvement with the FBI.'75  McKevitt,
Pallasch, and McRoberts undertook the project with the intent of
compiling an informative piece of work to educate the public of
Rupert's dealings with the FBI.17 6
Finally, the journalists' information was available through
alternative sources. For this third factor, courts place the burden of
170. See Shoen discussion, supra note 108 and accompanying text.
171. See 735 ILCS 5/8-907, supra note 88 and accompanying text.
172. See Shoen, supra note 108 and accompanying text. The von Bulow
balancing test adopted in Shoen has also been used to direct other courts in their
analysis. See Neal, supra note 139. See also Hutira, supra note 135.
173. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533.
174. See Shoen, supra note 108. "In sum, we see no principled basis for
denying the protection of the journalist's privilege to investigative book authors
while granting it to more traditional print and broadcast journalists. What
makes journalism journalism is not its format but its content." Id. at 1293.
175. See discussion supra Part II.A.
176. Id.
390
28
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss2/7
McKE VITT v. PALLASCH
proof on the plaintiff seeking the disclosure to demonstrate that he
has exhausted all possible alternatives for the information.177
Although McKevitt's attorneys wanted the tapes turned over
because they felt the tapes would greatly benefit their defense
efforts, they failed to identify any specific inconsistencies or
specific impeaching evidence they hoped to find in the reporters'
tapes.178
Even the Irish Court declined to state on the record that it
recommended the materials to be turned over.'79 McKevitt's
attorneys did not identify any specific information they hoped the
tapes would reveal. 80 They simply wanted to use the material to
impeach Rupert's credibility. 8' But for the reporters' endeavor of
writing Rupert's biography, McKevitt's attorneys would be no
better or worse off. In essence, Rupert is no different than any
other witness being called to testify.
Courts hold that a journalist's work product, undertaken for the
purpose of disseminating information to the public, should not be
disturbed absent a sufficient showing that all other avenues for the
information have been exhausted. This takes into account the
protection that is afforded for the gathering and dissemination of
news, while leaving room for a court's discretion. Despite the fact
that courts in other districts, including Illinois, have adopted this
method when evaluating a reporter's claimed privilege, the
McKevitt Panel failed to recognize it. However, had the Panel
considered these three factors, they would have clearly realized
that McKevitt failed to sufficiently demonstrate the need to
overcome the qualified reporter's privilege.
177. See Hutira, supra note 136 and accompanying text.
178. Pet. of Defendants-Appellants for R'hing en banc at p. 2, McKevitt v.
Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003) (03-2754).
179. Herguth's Emergency Mot., supra note 93, at 13.
180. Herguth's Emergency Mot., supra note 93, at 13.
181. Herguth's Emergency Mot., supra note 93, at 13.
2004]
29
Stamp: McKevitt v. Pallasch: How the Ghosts of the Branzburg Decision Ar
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART. & ENT. LAW [Vol. XIV: 363
VI. IMPACT
The impact of the McKevitt decision has already been felt. The
Panel's startling departure from the trend alarmed many because of
the crippling effect of such a broad policy enacted by the Seventh
Circuit. 82 So shocking and troublesome was the decision that the
top leaders in the news industry joined forces in an amicus curiae
brief petitioning the Seventh Circuit to reconsider the issue en
banc. '83 The media expressed its concern over the radical
departure from precedent stating, "the Panel has issued a far-
reaching Opinion that threatens to strip reporters and news
organizations that publish material in this circuit of any First
Amendment protection.' 8 4
By refusing to recognize even a qualified privilege, the
McKevitt decision has seriously threatened the news gathering
activities of journalists who work in Wisconsin, Illinois and
Indiana.'85 Not only will news gathering efforts be hampered by
the threat of court-ordered disclosure, but "news
organizations.. .will necessarily avoid coverage of subjects likely
to be the subject of litigation."'86 This will directly impair and
threaten the free flow of information that is intended to be the very
function of the press.'87
The Panel's decision has opened the newsroom door to any
private litigant searching for information that could be useful in his
or her efforts.88 Arguably, the government may now employ
journalists such as Pallasch, et.al. to depose witnesses. However, a
reporter's work product should not be handed over simply so that a
party can trawl around hoping to find something helpful for trial.
In their Brief of Amicus Curiae, media around the globe expressed
concern that "the credibility of a news organization as an impartial
182. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 2.
183. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 2.
184. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 2.
185. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 2.
186. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 6.
187. See discussion supra Part II.A.
188. See Brief of Amicus Curiae supra note 1, at 19.
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observer and its ability to gain access to otherwise unavailable
information will inevitably be undermined if reporters become
routine sources or witnesses for one side or the other in an
adversarial process."' 8 9
Without a qualified privilege, it is uncertain as to what is
protected from forced disclosure. 9' Furthermore, the Panel's
decision allows the disclosure of materials in areas that might
otherwise enjoy protection in a different Circuit. 9' Courts have
long recognized the importance of a free press, unfettered from
governmental control and regulation.'92 However, the Panel breaks
with tradition and precedent, establishing that a reporter's work
product is not privileged.' 93
McKevitt requires district courts to square their prior decisions,
which recognize the privilege, with the Panel's inconsistent
holding. 9 ' District courts in the Seventh Circuit have routinely
balanced the need and ability of the information to be disclosed
with the concern for protecting the free-flow of ideas.'95 The
Panel's approach is inconsistent with lower courts' treatment of
the issue and will pose a problem when district courts are faced
with the issue in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, journalists in the Seventh Circuit are caught in a
state of confusion, disbelief, and concern. Work product will be
more guarded as reporters seek to balance the need to drive public
debate through the use of confidential sources with protecting
those sources and work product from court-ordered disclosure.
189. See Brief of Amicus Curiae supra note 1, at 6.
190. See Brief of Amicus Curiae supra note 1, at 2, 19.
191. See Brief of Amicus Curiae supra note 1, at 2. See also Circuits that
recognize a qualified journalist's privilege, supra note 136.
192. See discussion supra Part I.A.
193. See discussion supra Part III.B.
194. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 3 (urging the Court to
reconsider the issue due to the fact that it conflicts with decisions from ten out
of eleven Circuits that have recognized some form of privilege).
195. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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This country was founded on the belief that the media and
journalists occupy a very critical niche in society. They function
as watchdogs and inquisitors in the balance of government.
In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court was faced with a difficult job;
balancing the need for a free press with the need of a grand jury to
function free from interference. Although the Court ultimately
refused to recognize immunity for a journalist who was
subpoenaed, many justices expressed their concern and stressed
the narrow application of the Court's decision.'96
The dissenting Justices' concerns were noted as Circuit by
Circuit recognized a qualified journalist's privilege.'97 However,
the three-member Seventh Circuit Panel was unconvinced.
McKevitt does not reconcile with the volumes of decisions that
applied a carefully constructed test to discern the existence of a
qualified journalist's privilege. However, this is the decision that
journalists in the Seventh Circuit must deal with. Only time will
tell whether the ghosts of Branzburg will continue to haunt
journalists in the Seventh Circuit. Let the watchdogs beware!
Heather Stamp
196. See discussion, supra notes 84-85.
197. See Circuits that recognize a qualified journalist's privilege, supra note
136.
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